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The literature on voluntary provision of public goods includes recent theoretical work on the formation
of voluntary coalitions to provide public goods.  Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition
size and contribution rates.  We examine the emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty
in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition size.  We find that contributions
decrease when public good returns are uncertain but increase when individuals can form a coalition
to provide the good.  Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the
public good benefits are higher. Uncertainty has no effect on coalition size.
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1. Introduction 
  Theory tells us that despite free-riding, individuals will voluntarily contribute to public 
goods, though at far lower levels than efficient (Bergstrom et al. 1986, Bernheim 1986, 
Hirschleifer 1983). Experimental evidence suggests that voluntary provision will be substantially 
higher than theory suggests (Ledyard 1995), though still at inefficient levels.  The nascent 
theoretical literature on coalition formation in public goods provision
2 suggests that modest 
increases in overall provision result from the spontaneous formation of subgroups (coalitions) of 
the population to jointly provide public goods.
3  Furthermore, that literature suggests a 
relationship between coalition size and per capita benefits of the public good.  However, there is 
ambiguity in this literature regarding which of several models of coalition formation and 
behavior is most appropriate.  Additionally, there is debate over how uncertainty influences 
coalition formation and public goods provision: some suggest uncertainty serves to strengthen 
coalitions (Young 1994), while others argue that it weakens them (Iida 1993). 
  This paper seeks to provide the first joint theoretical and experimental treatment of 
coalitions in voluntary public good provision, quantifying the effectiveness of these coalitions in 
increasing public good provision.  We present a simple theory of coalition formation with and 
without uncertainty and then test the predictions of this theory using a laboratory experiment.  To 
the best of our knowledge, research on subgroup formation in public goods provision 
experiments has not used theory to directly motivate experimental design. Consequently, there 
                                                 
2 The theoretical literature on coalition formation in public goods provision is primarily cast in the context of self-
enforcing international environmental agreements for the control of global environmental problems.  This literature 
treats each country as a single utility-maximizing agent; consequently, most work is completely equivalent to and 
can be interpreted as voluntary provision of public goods by individual agents.  Some additional literature (primarily 
empirical) pertains to international monetary agreements (Iida 1993). 
3 This is akin to the provision of club goods except that members of the coalition (club) enjoy no more access to the 
benefits of the public good than do non-club members (Sandler and Tschirhart 1997).       3      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
has been a disconnect between experimental and theoretical approaches to public goods 
provision.  
Our experimental results support some theoretical predictions but call others into 
question. Our strongest result contradicts one of the basic conclusions of the theoretical literature 
—that coalition size decreases with the benefits from public good provision.  Furthermore, 
experimental evidence suggests that uncertainty tends to decrease the provision of public goods, 
both when coalitions can and cannot form. Finally, although some theories argue that uncertainty 
will increase coalition size, while others make the opposite prediction, we find little evidence 
that uncertainty either increases or decreases coalition size. 
  In the next section of the paper we discuss the relevant literature on coalition formation in 
a public goods setting.  In section 3 section we present a simple theoretical model of public 
goods provision and coalition formation, based on the model in Kolstad and Ulph (2008).  The 
theoretical model provides certain testable hypotheses about coalition size and the role of 
uncertainty.  In section 4 we turn to our experimental investigation, developing a model based on 
the established experimental literature on public goods provision, which we extended to 
endogenous coalition formation and uncertainty.  We use the model to test the theoretically 
based hypotheses of behavior.  
 
2. Coalition Formation and the Experimental Literature 
This paper contributes to two separate but closely related literatures in economics. At the 
most basic level, we expand on the growing public goods provision literature in experimental 
economics. Although much of this literature focuses on public goods, certain topics have 
received less attention—two such areas are coalition formation and uncertainty. Moreover, to the       4      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
best of our knowledge, no paper has examined these issues jointly.  Second, we offer a test of the 
theoretical literature on coalition formation in the context of international environmental 
agreements, exploring competing theoretical hypotheses regarding the operation of such 
agreements. 
 
2.1 Coalition Formation 
  In confronting public goods problems, a primary challenge is to develop a mechanism 
that coordinates actions in a mutually beneficial way. Forming a coalition is one way for agents 
to overcome the free-rider problem. It happens that much of the theoretical literature on coalition 
formation is in the context of the formation of international environmental agreements (IEA), in 
which countries are modeled as having a single payoff function.  Leaving aside the issue of 
whether modeling a country with a single utility/payoff function is appropriate, the fact is that all 
of the results from the IEA literature can be interpreted as results for individual interacting utility 
maximizing agents forming coalitions to provide public goods. 
When facing a global environmental problem, countries must decide whether to emit or 
abate pollution. Countries prefer collective abatement over independent action but have a strong 
incentive to free-ride on others’ actions. Early work on IEAs demonstrated that a coalition 
mechanism can partially overcome the free-rider problem (Hoel 1992, Barrett 1994, Carraro and 
Siniscalco 1993). However, coalitions are unlikely to be large. If we define the marginal per 
capita return (MPCR) to abatement in terms of the environmental benefit from a unit of 
abatement, the literature can be summarized in terms of the effect of MPCR on equilibrium 
coalition size.   If a large coalition is an equilibrium, then it must be the case that the benefits 
from cooperation are small (MPCR low).  The higher the MPCR, the greater the incentives to       5      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
free ride and thus the small the equilibrium coalition.  Similarly, with low MPCR, the attraction 
of joining the coalition (versus remaining in the fringe) is stronger and a larger coalition will 
emerge. In other words, we are likely to see broad coalitions form only when they are least 
beneficial. We provide a more formal explanation in Section 3. 
  Another common feature of global public good problems is uncertainty. Most early 
research in the IEA literature considered situations in which the benefits of abatement are 
known. If benefits are uncertain, however, the coalition formation process may change. The 
literature on coalition formation under uncertainty provides ambiguous predictions. While 
Young (1994) suggests that uncertainty can facilitate the formation of international agreements, 
others, like Iida (1993), find that uncertainty hinders coalition formation. In a recent paper, 
Kolstad and Ulph (2008) analyze coalition formation with uncertainty and learning in a game-
theoretic environment. They find that the effect of uncertainty on the optimal coalition size is 
ambiguous. We draw on this paper to motivate our experimental design and hypotheses, outlined 
in section 3.  
 
2.2 Public Goods Provision in Experimental Economics 
Early experimental work on public good provision established that subjects tend to 
provide public goods at higher rates than predicted by Nash equilibrium theory (e.g. Marwell and 
Ames 1979, Kim and Walker 1984). Since that time, experimentalists have focused their 
attention on why subjects contribute at the rates they do and what mechanisms affect 
contribution rates. For instance, a common assumption was that larger groups would have more 
difficulty providing public goods. Instead, as Isaac and Walker (1988) demonstrated, marginal 
per capita return (MCPR) predominantly determines contribution levels—there is no separate       6      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
pure group size effect.
4  One possible reason for these results is that subjects are confused by the 
experimental setup.  Andreoni (1995) explores this issue and concludes it is not a valid 
explanation of the divergence between theory and experiments. 
More recently, there has been some research on endogenous group formation (e.g., 
Ehrhart and Keser 1999) wherein subjects can join or leave groups either freely or with 
restrictions. These studies examine how individuals that form (sub)groups provide public goods. 
However, much of the work in this area emphasizes different methods of matching individuals in 
groups (Gunnthorsdottir et al 2007, Page et al 2005). Most experiments on endogenous group 
formation use multi-period designs, where subjects have the opportunity to change their group 
affiliation over time. Page et al (2005) allow subjects to express a preference for partners in the 
next period based on past performance of other subjects. Ahn et al. (2008) examine entry/exit 
institutions for group formation but do not allow for formal agreements. Research on group size 
has tended to focus on how the number of subjects affects public goods provision and largely 
ignores the determinants of group or subgroup size.  A recent exception is Charness and Yang 
(2007). Finally, few if any endogenous group formation experiments base their experimental 
design on theoretical models of group formation, such as the international agreements literature.  
While the existing group formation literature investigates how individuals provide public 
goods in different group settings, it does not focus on formal sub-groups or coalitions per se.
5 
And although there is a sizeable literature on coalition formation,
6 much of it is an extension of 
the classic two-person ultimatum/bargaining literature (e.g. Guth et al 1982) to three (or more) 
                                                 
4 Isaac et al (1994) provide support for these findings using significantly larger groups. 
5 An exception is Ahn et al. (2005), which allows for sub-groups with little coordination among participants. 
Moreover, this study places no constraints on the number of groups, nor are the sub-groups endowed with a specific 
purpose.  
6 Bolton and Chatterjee (1996) provide a summary of the theoretical literature on coalition formation as well as a 
brief overview of experimental work.         7      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
persons.
7 By and large, most studies do not analyze coalition formation in a large-group setting. 
Confining themselves to a three-person setting,
8 Bolton and Chatterjee (1996) provide evidence 
that communication structures matter both for coalition formation and payoff distribution. 
Building on this and other work, Okada and Riedl (2005) find evidence that reciprocal actions 
strongly affect outcomes in a coalition bargaining game and that players will often choose 
inefficient subcoalitions, as a result. However, these coalition formation experiments deal with 
utility-maximizing bargains, not social outcomes or public goods.  
  Neither risk nor uncertainty has received significant attention in the experimental 
literature on public goods or coalition/bargaining games. Murnighan et al. (1988) explore the 
effects of risk aversion on outcomes in bargaining games. They find that while risk-averse 
bargainers perform better on high-stakes games, the effects are somewhat weak. In coalition 
games, risk aversion appears to predict coalition formation but not payoff distribution in 
inexperienced bargainers (Bottom et al 2000); experienced bargainers exhibit the opposite 
behavior. There is some evidence that uncertainty affects cooperation in public goods games. 
Berger and Hershey (1994) demonstrate that subjects are less likely to contribute to a public 
good when returns are stochastic than when returns are deterministic. In Dickinson (1998) 
subjects make voluntary contributions to a public good in which there is some probability that 
the group payoff will be zero. Dickinson finds limited evidence that uncertainty reduces 
individual but not group contributions. To the best of our knowledge, no one has yet examined 
how uncertain payoffs affect group formation.  
 
                                                 
7 For a summary of bargaining, see Camerer (2003) or Roth (1996).  
8 As Bolton and Chatterjee point out, limiting coalition analysis to a three-person setting allows researchers to 
analyze the inherent complexities of having more than two people but without adding additional confounding 
effects.       8      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
3. Theoretical Predictions of Coalition Formation 
  Let there be i=1,…,I identical individuals with unitary endowments.  Each individual has 
two choices: spend the endowment on private consumption or allocate the endowment to public 
consumption.  Public consumption generates less for the donor but more for the group of 
individuals: 
  Πi = (1-qi) + γQ  ,   Q = Σi qi      ( 1 )  
Where qi is the allocation to public consumption, assumed to be discrete (either zero or one) and 
Πi is the total payoff to i.
9  The parameter 0 < γ < 1 is the private payoff from a unit of the public 
good, also known in the literature as the marginal per capita return to public consumption 
(MPCR).  Clearly, in this setting, a Nash equilibrium will involve no contribution to public 
consumption: qi = 0, whereas a Pareto optimal allocation will involve no private consumption: qi 
= 1.
10 
  We are concerned with one primary issue here: the formation of coalitions to coordinate 
public contributions.  In particular, we will allow for the formation of a group of N≤I individuals 
which will act in concert to provide public consumption.  All the members of this coalition will 
act the same, in the best interests of the coalition as a whole.   
  To formalize this notion of coalition formation, we consider a two-stage game, the first a 
membership game to determine coalition membership and the second a public goods contribution 
game to determine how much of the public good will be contributed.  We assume that once 
membership has been determined, it is fixed for the second stage.  
                                                 
9 The reason for choosing the discrete choice contribution mechanism (all or nothing to the public good) is to 
simplify the decision process for the coalition, particularly in the context of the experiment.  A discrete choice for 
individuals translates into a discrete choice for the coalition which can be easily decided by a single vote.  
Continuous levels of contributions would require a more complex process for determining the coalition actions. 
10 This is a standard model in the literature on international environmental agreements (e.g., Kolstad and Ulph 
2008), although we use somewhat different terminology.       9      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
  The membership game is an announcement game, in which individuals announce “in” or 
“out” of a single coalition.  We are seeking a Nash equilibrium in announcements.  Participation 
in the coalition is voluntary, and members cannot exclude potential entrants. After the 
membership of the coalition and fringe (all players not in the coalition) has been determined, the 
coalition acts as one, jointly deciding on an action for the entire coalition using majority rule.  
Many decision-making mechanisms will work for the members of the coalition to make a joint 
decision, including majority voting.  In our framework (because of the homogeneity of all 
participants), the result will be an action which maximizes the joint payoff of the coalition 
members.
11 Furthermore, the coalition acts as one agent in a Nash game in contributions with the 
fringe.   
More specifically, for a coalition of size N, let Π
c(N) and Π
f(N) be the payoffs to a 
member of the coalition and the fringe, respectively, from the contributions stage game.  These 
payoffs are a function of the size of the coalition only.  Clearly, members of the fringe will 
always choose private consumption, with a payoff of 1 plus any payoff from public consumption 
by others (γQ).  The coalition will choose public consumption if 
Πc(N) = γQ = γN ≥ 1 Ù N ≥ 1/γ         (2) 
Conversely, if N < 1/γ, coalition members will choose private consumption. Implicitly and 
arbitrarily, we assume that indifference between public and private consumption results in public 
consumption.  
We now turn to the membership game.  We are interested in a Nash equilibrium in 
announcements to be in either the fringe or the coalition.  Using the terminology of cartel theory, 
                                                 
11 Clearly, with heterogeneous agents, majority voting reflects the interests of the median voter and may not yield a 
joint payoff maximum.  That issue is moot here since all agents are identical.  With homogenous agents, majority 
rule, unanimity and joint payoff maximization are all equivalent.       1 0      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
as well as the literature on international environmental agreements, this leads to the following 
definitions: 
Definition 1:  A coalition of size N is internally stable if Π
c(N) > Π
f(N-1). 
Definition 2:  A coalition of size N is externally stable if Π
f(N) > Π
c(N+1). 
Definition 3:  A coalition of size N is stable if it is externally and internally stable. 
In other words, the coalition is internally stable if no individual wishes to leave to join the fringe; 
it is externally stable if no fringe member wants to join the coalition.  In this linear framework, 
there is one and only one non-trivial stable coalition. 
Let N* be the Nash equilibrium in the membership game; i.e., the stable number of 
members of the coalition.  It is useful to define one more simple function, the “rounding-up” 
function which rounds a real number up to an integer: 
Definition 4:  Define I(x) as the smallest integer greater than or equal to x. 
This leads to the following result: 
Proposition 1.  In a simple two-stage homogeneous membership-contributions game with payoffs 
as in Eqn. (1), the equilibrium number of members of the coalition is N*=I(1/γ), which is the size 
of the stable coalition. 
  The intuition behind this proposition is that N* is the minimum size of coalition which 
wishes to fully invest in the public investment.  For any smaller coalition (such as N* -1), it is 
optimal to fully invest in the private good.  Thus any coalition member is pivotal; departure from 
the coalition causes a significant change in payoffs, sufficient to provide an incentive not to 
depart.  Similarly, there is no incentive for any fringe member to join the coalition since a 
coalition of size N* + 1 continues to fully invest in the public good (Kolstad and Ulph, 2008).       1 1      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
  We can now introduce the notion of uncertainty in public good provision into the 
framework.  Suppose there are two possible states of the world, high (H) and low (L), with 
probabilities π and (1-π), respectively.  Let γ take on a value dependent on the state of the world: 
γH and γL, in expectation simply γ.  We assume that the state of the world is revealed between the 
two stages of the game; thus, in the membership game, agents are unaware of the state of the 
world but in the contributions game they do know the state of the world. This assumption is 
consistent with previous theory (Kolstad and Ulph 2008, Ulph 2004) and, to some extent, with 
real-world experiences. The decision to join a coalition is a strategic decision with longer-term 
consequences than the more tactical and short-term decision of how much to contribute to a 
public good.  Strategic decisions may occur far in advance of tactical decisions as they in fact 
have on international agreements to provide public environmental goods.  This characterization 
only provides intuition since this theoretical model is static. 
Unfortunately, clear and unambiguous results on the effect of uncertainty are not 
available in the literature (see Kolstad and Ulph, 2008).  This ambiguity suggests that it is an 
empirical question whether the coalition is larger or smaller under uncertainty. 
We use the model above to lay out theory-based predictions and construct the 
experimental design we use to test those predictions. This model provides a standard result that 
the size of the coalition, N*, is equal to the smallest integer greater than the inverse of the ratio 
of costs to benefits. Based on a Nash equilibrium of zero contributions in an uncoordinated 
public goods game, we expect to see coalition size follow the theoretical prediction. However, 
given that public goods experiments consistently find non-Nash prediction levels, we will also be 
interested in systematic deviations from the theoretical (N*) prediction. Additionally, we vary γ       1 2      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
across sessions, and this allows us to test whether coalition size decreases as γ increases, as 
predicted by theory.  
  In more formal terms, the two hypotheses we consider are as follows:  
 
i.  The coalition mechanism increases contributions to the public good over the baseline 
treatment (standard public goods). 
ii.  Coalition size decreases as MPCR (γ) increases.  
iii.   
Hypothesis (i) simply tests whether allowing coalitions makes any difference. Hypothesis 
(ii) tests the basic result in the theory (Prop. 1).  Uncertainty has an ambiguous effect; thus 
theory does not suggest whether contributions should fall when we introduce uncertainty in the 
public goods treatment or the coalition formation treatment. In particular, standard theory 
predicts zero contributions with or without uncertainty, and we look to the lab to provide 
empirical guidance regarding the role of uncertainty.  
 
4. Experimental Design 
  Our experimental design allows us to test the theoretical predictions outlined in the 
previous section. The experiment comprises four treatments:  (1) a standard public goods game, 
(2) public goods with uncertainty, (3) public goods with coalition formation, and (4) coalition 
formation with uncertainty. We explain these four treatments in more detail below. Drawing on a 
pool of undergraduate and graduate students from the University of California, Santa Barbara, 
we recruited ten participants for each of eight experimental sessions (n = 10). Each session 
included the four treatments with twenty periods per treatment. In total, we have observations on 
80 subjects and 640 periods. We conducted all experiments in a computer lab using the software 
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).  Subjects received payment for participating at the rate of $0.01 for       1 3      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
each experimental monetary unit (EMU) earned during the experiment.
12 Average earnings per 
subject were between $20-25, and each session lasted approximately 90 minutes. Once subjects 
had completed all four treatments, we administered a brief questionnaire to gather demographic 
data for later analysis. After all subjects completed the questionnaire, we totaled subjects’ 
earnings and paid them in cash. 
  Below we describe the four treatments in our experiment. For more detailed information, 
we provide a copy of the script used in all eight sessions in appendix A.  
  
4.1 Treatment 1: Public Goods 
The first treatment in our experiment is a standard public goods game with a voluntary 
contribution mechanism. This treatment provides a baseline with which to compare the effects of 
coalition formation and uncertainty. In each period, subjects receive an endowment of w tokens 
that they must allocate to either a private investment or a public investment.
13 The private 
investment returns one EMU at the end of the period, while the public investment provides a 
lower private return, the MPCR, but more in total to the group. The MPCR was 0.3 in sessions 1-
3 and 7 and increased to 0.6 in the sessions 4-6 and 8. In other words, if all 10 subjects allocate 
their endowment to the public investment, each and every person receives n*w*MPCR EMUs. 
Clearly, the Nash equilibrium in this game is to allocate zero tokens to the public investment 
whereas Pareto optimality requires all tokens be allocated to the public investment.  
Deviating from most public goods experiments, we use a binary contribution mechanism. 
In other words, despite the fact that w is not binary, subjects must allocate all or none of their 
endowment to the public investment each period. As explained in Section 3, the binary 
                                                 
12 If earnings totaled less than $5, the subject receives a $5 minimum payment. This constraint was never biding.  
13 In the experimental script, we refer to these as a “private project” and “public project,” respectively.        1 4      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
mechanism more closely mirrors the established theory and simplifies the coalitions’ allocation 
decision.
14 However, some research has shown that binary contribution mechanisms result in 
lower public good provision levels than continuous contribution mechanisms (Cadsby & Maynes 
1999). While continuous contribution designs are more common, the binary mechanism allows 
the experimental design to more closely match the theory. 
 
4.2 Treatment 2: Public Goods with Uncertainty 
   In treatment two the return on the public investment becomes uncertain. In each round 
there is a 1/3 probability that the public investment will not pay out. If this occurs, all subjects 
receive a zero return on any contributions made to the public investment. Correspondingly, there 
is a 2/3 probability that the public investment will pay out in full. In order to preserve the 
expected value of public investment returns, we increase the MPCR in the uncertainty treatments 
by 50 percent: sessions in which the initial MPCR was 0.3 (0.6) offer an MPCR of 0.45 (0.9) 
when public good provision is uncertain. In all other ways, this treatment is the same as 
treatment one.  
 
4.3 Treatment 3: Coalition Formation 
  In treatment three we introduce the coalition formation mechanism as a modification to 
treatment one. Before making their investment decisions in each period, subjects must first elect 
to either join the coalition or remain in the fringe. Once subjects have formed the coalition, the 
software reports the coalition size to all subjects. In our theoretical model, the coalition uses 
                                                 
14 In a theoretical environment, agents are homogenous, thus voting is unnecessary. In an experimental setting, 
however, agents are likely to have heterogeneous contribution preferences, either due to preferences that are not 
strictly rational or to simple errors in decision-making. While the voting mechanism departs from the theory, it is a 
necessary and pragmatic feature of the experiment.        1 5      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
majority voting to determine the joint action.  This approach is also used in the experimental 
design.  If a majority of the coalition votes to contribute, the coalition’s entire endowment is 
pooled and allocated to the public investment. If the majority votes not to contribute, then the 
coalition allocates its entire endowment to the private investment.
15 To be as consistent with the 
theory as possible, the coalition cannot subdivide its collective endowment. In the event of a tie, 
a virtual coin flip determines the allocation decision. At the end of the period the coalition is 
reset and the next period begins with an “empty” coalition—coalition membership does not carry 
over between periods.  
 
4.4 Treatment 4: Coalition Formation with Uncertainty 
  Treatment four combines the coalition formation mechanism with uncertainty in public 
goods provision. This treatment is similar to treatment three, except that subjects do not know 
whether the public investment will pay out when they make their decision to join the coalition. 
However, once the coalition has formed the software reports the “state of the world” to all 
subjects. In other words, before the coalition (as a whole) and the fringe (individually) make 
their allocation decision, all subjects are informed whether the public investment will return zero 
or 1.5*MPCR at the end of the period. The uncertainty in treatment four is resolved between the 
coalition formation stage and the public good allocation stage to be consistent with theory.
16 
Once again, the probability of non-provision is 1/3. With the exception of the uncertainty 
element, this treatment is identical to treatment three.  
                                                 
15 Because we are focusing on a public good—and not a club good—public investment contributions from both the 
coalition and the fringe determine the public investment return for all subjects, whether or not they are members of 
the coalition.  
16 Conditional on being in the coalition, subjects generally make the “correct” assessment of whether the coalition 
should contribute, with an error rate of approximately eight percent (voting to contribute when it is certain the public 
good will not payout). Subjects in the fringe made no errors of this kind.        1 6      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
  Our theory makes specific predictions about what size of coalition we should expect to 
observe in the case of certainty: an MPCR of 0.3 should produce a coalition of size four, while 
raising the return on the public good to 0.6 should reduce the coalition size to two.  
 
5. Results 
  In this section we present two approaches to analyzing our data. We use both non-
parametric and regression methods to analyze data from our experiments, recognizing the 
limitations of each. We begin with simple statistical tests of the hypotheses described in the 
previous section. Non-parametric analysis requires minimal statistical assumptions, but may not 
capture more subtle results. We then develop two regression models of group and individual 
behavior to further test our hypotheses. 
 
5.1 Summary of Experimental Results 
  Subjects in our first treatment contributed to the public good at rates comparable those in 
most previous public goods experiments. Despite the Nash prediction that subjects will allocate 
zero tokens to the public good, we find contribution rates of between 50 and 70 percent in the 
initial periods. Contributions decline over time to between 20 and 30 percent by the end of each 
treatment. Figure 1 shows the pattern of contribution rates over time for treatment one, the 
standard public goods game with binary contributions. Because subjects must allocation all or 
none of their endowment, the time trend in Figure 1 is relatively volatile, even after averaging 
across sessions.    
  Figure 2 shows average coalition size over time in the coalition treatment and the 
coalition with uncertainty treatment. The size of a coalition is the number of individuals who       1 7      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
elect to join in a given period. Recall that the coalition resets after each period, so coalition size 
is not a function of members “dropping out” per se. While coalition size exhibits a declining 
trend similar to contribution rates, there is a noticeable degree of stability between periods 5 and 
15. In both treatments coalition size stabilizes after an initial decay and then falls as the subjects 
near the end of the treatment. However, there is no obvious difference in coalition size between 
the no-uncertainty and uncertainty treatments.  
It is instructive to examine how subjects behaved in the different experimental sessions. 
Table 1 shows the mean contribution rates for each treatment across all eight sessions. Subjects 
contributed an average of 41.1 percent of their tokens to the public good in the standard public 
goods treatment, while rates declined to 38.9 percent when the public good provision was 
uncertain. In the coalition treatment, contribution rates increased to 48.1 percent but fell by seven 
percent when we introduced uncertainty.  
  While the above averages suggest a relatively consistent pattern across treatments, there 
is significant variability across sessions. It is possible that the variability in contributions is in 
part a function of the binary contribution mechanism. Although we cannot test this conjecture 
rigorously with our data, previous work on binary contribution mechanisms is consistent with 
highly variable contribution rates (e.g., Cadsby and Maynes 1999).  
In our initial six sessions, we reversed the order of non-coalition and coalition treatments 
in sessions three and six. Concerned that the unusually low contribution rates in the public goods 
treatment in session three might be a result of order effects, we ran two additional sessions using 
the standard order described in section 3. However, as Table 1 shows, session seven has similar 
contribution rates as session three. Consequently, we see no obvious reason to exclude these data       1 8      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
from our analysis. Excluding sessions three and six does not dramatically change the majority of 
our findings, thus we analyze all eight sessions of data in the remainder of the paper.
17  
Because varying the MPCR is important to our analysis, we consider the data for the high 
(0.6) and low (0.3) MPCR sessions separately. Table 2 provides a summary of the contribution 
rate and coalition size in each treatment for high and low MPCR sessions, averaged across all 20 
periods in each treatment. Once again, contribution rates increase with the introduction of the 
coalition mechanism but decrease when public good provision is uncertain. As in previous 
experimental studies, a higher MPCR induces higher contribution rates.  
The high MPCR sessions had dramatically larger average coalition sizes for both no-
uncertainty and uncertainty treatments, 5.1 in each. However, coalition size does not appear to 
vary systematically depending on whether or not the public good is uncertain. Average coalition 
size was 3.5 in the low-MPCR sessions with no uncertainty and slightly lower, 3.45, under 
uncertainty.  
 
5.1 Statistical Analysis 
We now evaluate the statistical robustness of our results, using non-parametric tests on 
both session- and subject-level data. By using non-parametric tests we avoid making 
distributional assumptions that may not be warranted. Session averages are appealing because 
they constitute the only truly independent observations; however, the small sample-size (N=8) is 
limiting. Consequently, we also consider subject-level differences across treatments. Using a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
18 we cannot reject the null hypothesis that contribution rates are equal 
                                                 
17 In subsequent analysis, we indicate when excluding these treatments affects our results.  
18 We use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to non-parametrically test the equality of matched pairs of observations, 
where the observations are the averages across all periods either for sessions (N=8) or subjects (N=80). The test       1 9      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
in the public goods treatments with and without uncertainty, either at the session (one-tailed,
19 p 
= 0.17) or subject level (one-tailed, p = 0.36). However, we do find evidence that contribution 
rates fall in the coalition treatments with uncertainty using session-level data (one-tailed, p = 
0.005). Subject-level data provide stronger results (one-tailed, p = 0.000). Thus we find some 
support for the hypothesis that uncertainty reduces contribution rates. 
We are also interested in whether the coalition mechanism increases average contribution 
rates over the simple public goods treatment. Comparing treatments one and three, we can only 
reject the null hypothesis of equal contribution rates in the public goods and coalition treatments 
at the ten-percent level (one-tailed, p = 0.10).
20 Using data at the subject level we find stronger 
support for the idea that the coalition mechanism raises contribution rates (one-tailed, p = 0.005).  
We also find evidence that the coalition mechanism increases contributions when the public 
good is uncertain (one-tailed, p = 0.06). Here the evidence is less-strong at the subject level (one-
tailed, p = 0.15). Overall, allowing subjects to form a coalition tends to increase the rate at which 
they contribute to the public good, as theory predicts.  
  Turning to the issue of coalition size, we are interested in the effect of MPCR and 
uncertainty on coalition size.  Let the null hypotheses be that coalition size will (1) be unaffected 
by uncertainty and (2) fall as the MPCR rises. Our results confirm the former but refute the 
latter. Using a signed-rank test we cannot reject the null hypothesis that coalition size is equal 
across treatments with and without uncertainty at the session level (two-tailed, p = 0.94). The 
                                                                                                                                                             
takes into account both the direction (“sign”) and magnitude (“rank”) of the difference in pairs of outcomes for an 
observational unit.  
19 Because theory predicts the direction of the difference between treatments, we use a one-tailed test. To test on the 
effect of uncertainty on coalition size, where theory is ambiguous, we use a two-tailed test.  
20 This result is sensitive to excluding the “reverse order” treatments, three and six. Without these treatments we can 
only reject the null hypothesis at the 30 percent level for the session-level data, and the subject-level results are only 
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theory suggests uncertainty has an ambiguous effect on coalition membership, and the empirical 
results shed no additional light on the matter.  
In contrast, we reject the null hypothesis of equal coalition size across low and high 
MPCR using Mann-Whitney test
21 (one-tailed, p = 0.030) in favor of the alternative hypothesis, a 
positive effect of MPCR. In other words, an increase the MPCR increases coalition size, 
contrary to theory. We find similar evidence when public good provision is uncertain (one-tailed, 
p = 0.042). This result strongly contradicts hypothesis iii: we find that coalition size increases 
with MPCR. The pattern is clear in the data and statistically robust: a higher return on the public 
good tends to strengthen the coalition.  
  Tests of the differences across treatments suggest that a higher MPCR raises both 
contribution rate and coalition size. Additionally, the coalition mechanism tends to increase 
contribution rates. However, there is only weak evidence that uncertainty affects whether 
subjects contribute to the public good, and little evidence of an effect on coalition size. 
  Finally, we also ran all of these tests using only data from periods six through twenty. As 
is common in lab experiments, the first five periods have a higher degree of volatility, which 
may be due to subjects’ unfamiliarity with the experiment. By dropping the first five periods, we 
consider the results of a more “stable” set of periods. In general, this exclusion has only a modest 
effect on our results, with p-values falling somewhat in most tests. For example, testing the effect 
of the coalition mechanism on contribution rates with no uncertainty, we can now reject the null 
using session-level data at the 0.03 significance level, where before we could only reject at the 
0.10 level.  
                                                 
21 The Mann-Whiteney test—also known as the Wilcoxon rank-sum test—is a non-parametric test of independent 
samples. Here we compare the average contribution rate for the high-MPCR sessions (N = 4) to the rates for low-
MPCR sessions (N = 4). Again, as theory suggests that an increase in MPCR should reduce coalition size, we use a 
one-tailed test.       2 1      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
 
5.2 Group-level Analysis 
  We use group-level regression techniques to control for both period and session fixed 
effects as we examine group-level behavior, where a group is the set of subjects in each session. 
The dependent variable is the per period average contribution rate, which we assume is a 
function of treatment effects and period. Our estimation equation is as follows 
jkt jkt block period high mpcr coalition uncert rate ε γ β β β α + + + + + = ) ( ) _ ( ) ( ) ( 3 2 1    
 (1) 
  where  j = session (2-8) 
   k  =  treatment 
t = period 
  The three variables of interest are uncert, coalition, and mpcr_high, which are dummy 
variables that indicate whether the public good was provided with uncertainty, whether the 
subjects had the option to form a coalition, and whether the mpcr was high, respectively.
22 Our 
hypothesis is that β1 < 0 and β2 > 0. The variable period block is a set of three dummy variables 
for periods 5-10, 11-15, and 15-20;
23 consequently, the coefficient vector δ captures the decay in 
contributions over time.  We present the group-level regression results in Table 3. We estimate 
(1) using a random effects estimator to account for session effects.
24 In column a we report 
results from a pooled regression, which includes data from both the high and low MPCR 
                                                 
22 We tried including an interaction term, uncert*coalition, to examine whether uncertainty plays a differential role 
in the coalition treatments, but this variable was not significant. 
23 We use period-block dummies rather than individual period dummies to economize on space. Running all 
regressions with individual period dummies does not significantly change the results.  
24 The choice of random effects is appropriate because our other regressors—namely the treatment dummies—are by 
definition uncorrelated with the unobservable individual-specific term.        2 2      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
sessions.
 The next two columns, b and c, provide separate regression results for each MPCR 
level. 
  The group-level regression results support our initial findings. In the pooled regression, 
the coefficients on both the coalition
25 and uncertainty variables are significant and of the 
predicted sign. Allowing subjects to form a coalition tends to increase the contribution rate by 
4.9 percentage points, while uncertainty in the public investment tends to reduce contributions by 
4.3 percentage points. The coefficient on the MPCR dummy is positive and significant, as 
expected. The coefficients on the period-block dummies are all negative and significant, which is 
consistent with the decay in contributions over time found in most public goods experiments 
(Ledyard 1995).  
 Regressions  b and c are provide similar results as the pooled regression but reveal 
heterogeneity in the effect of coalition formation. For both high and low MPCR sessions, the 
coalition mechanism tends to increase contribution rates. However, the coalition coefficient in 
the high MPCR regression is roughly half the magnitude of low MPRC coefficient and not 
significant at the 10 percent level (p = 0.11). The effect of uncertainty in both the high and low 
MPCR sessions is consistent, and the coefficient is significant in each.  
 
5.3 The Effect of the Voting Mechanism 
One concern is that the voting mechanism—which we use to aggregate individual 
decisions—may have an independent effect on contribution rates. Research on voting suggests 
that allowing subjects to express their preference for (or against) a collective decision tends to 
increase public goods provision (Walker et al. 2000). Unfortunately, it is difficult to separately 
                                                 
25 The significant coefficient on coalition formation is sensitive to discarding the data from our reverse order 
sessions (three and six). Excluding these data cause the coalition variable to become insignificant in the pooled and 
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identify the effect of voting, as it is a preference aggregation mechanism necessary to implement 
a rule that constrains group or individual behavior. In other words, in the voting literature, 
experimental subjects are always voting for a particular rule—e.g., allocation (Walker et al. 
2000), punishment (Feld and Tyran 2002), or expulsion (Cinyambuguma et al. 2005)—that may 
be the cause of elevated contributions. In this paper we use a fixed allocation rule, an all or 
nothing contribution scheme, which is binding for coalition members. The voting and coalition 
mechanisms are inherently linked.  
  Nevertheless, we can consider in part the consequences of voting in our experimental 
design. The theoretical model necessarily predicts unanimity among coalition members (due to 
homogeneous agents), but “real world” coalitions will likely suffer from internal dissent. Of the 
314 periods in which a coalition formed, 172 (55 percent) resulted in a unanimous decision by 
the coalition members; using a supermajority voting criterion of 80 percent, 233 (74 percent) 
coalitions attained this level of agreement. Coalitions are not consistently unanimous as the 
theory predicts, but the level of agreement among members is high.  
  Finally, if we redo the analysis in Section 5.2 and exclude observations from treatments 
three and four in which the coalition did not reach a unanimous decision, the results (not 
reported) are unchanged. The coalition mechanism has a strong, positive effect on contribution 
rates, and if anything, the observed effects are stronger. Consequently, while non-unanimous 
voting decisions are not predicted by theory, they appear to have little effect on the experimental 
results.  
5.4 Individual-level Analysis 
  In addition to analyzing group behavior, we can also look at individual-level choices. 
Again we use a random effects estimator, here to account for unobserved individual variation.       2 4      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
This model includes session dummies to account for session effects. We estimate the following 
model: 
)) . ( ) ( ) _ ( ) ( .) ( ( ) | 1 ( 3 2 1 block per session high mpcr coalition uncert G x allocation P ijkt γ τ β β β α + + + + + = =
    (2) 
  where  i = individual (80 subjects) 
   j  =  session  (2-8) 
   k  =  treatment 
   t  =  period 
  Because we employ a binary contribution mechanism, our dependent variable is a 
dichotomous indicator that equals one if i allocated her endowment to the public investment 
under treatment k in period t, session j. We include the treatment variables along with period 
dummies as before.   
  Table 4 presents results based on equation (2). We have suppressed the coefficients 
period controls to conserve space. Column (a) reports the random effects LPM results. Due to the 
well-known limitations of LPM models, we turn to our preferred specification, a random effects 
probit model, in column (b). The final two columns, c and d in Table 4 report separate random 
effects probit results for the high/low MPCR sessions. All reported probit estimates are 
regression coefficients and not partial effects.  
Once again, we find that being in the coalition treatment increases the likelihood that a 
subject contributes to the public investment, while uncertainty has the opposite effect. This result 
is consistent across pooled and non-pooled estimations in both the high and low MPCR cases.
26 
The LPM model indicates that an individual in a coalition treatment is 4.9 percent more likely to 
                                                 
26 Excluding sessions three and six, we do not find a statistically significant result on the coalition variable in either 
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contribute to the public good. Conversely, in the uncertainty treatment subjects are 
approximately 4.3 percent less likely to contribute to the public good. The sign and significance 
of the probit results are qualitatively consistent with the LPM model, although the results should 
not be interpreted as marginal effects.  
Lastly, because we collected some demographic data at the end of each session, we 
investigate any trends that emerge from the individual allocation results. While we do not report 
the detailed results here, we found that older individuals—mostly non-economics graduate 
students in our experiments—are more likely to contribute to the public good. Conversely, 
“experienced” students—those who have participated in previous experiments—tend to 
contribute less. Interestingly, women appear to contribute less than men, but this effect 
disappears once we control for age. Finally, economics students are no more or less likely to 
contribute than others. 
  
6. Conclusion 
Endogenous group formation is a growing area of research in experimental economics. 
And while the studies in this area are of high quality, few draw on theory to motivate 
experimental design. Conversely, there is a significant body of theoretical literature on the role of 
coalitions to provide public goods, especially in the context of international environmental 
agreements. Unfortunately, little of this theory has been tested. This study attempts to bridge 
these two research areas using experimental methods to test theoretical predictions of coalition 
formation.  
The literature on international environmental agreements has developed simple models 
that generate clear hypotheses. Using a laboratory environment we are able to provide insight       2 6      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
into whether these models accurately represent human behavior. Our results are mixed. We 
demonstrate that introducing a coalition mechanism can increase contributions to a public good, 
although this result is not as robust as some of our other findings. A stronger result is that while 
theory predicts an inverse relationship between coalition size and the return on the public good, 
we find the opposite. Doubling the MPCR from 0.3 to 0.6 increases coalition size by a 
statistically significant amount. From the perspective of public goods provision, this is a 
potentially promising finding. Existing theory states that coalitions are unlikely to form—and 
thus serve as an effective mechanism—when the benefits of public good provision are high. In 
fact, this study suggests coalitions may be more likely to form when they are most beneficial.  
We believe this result is consistent with earlier experimental work on voluntary public 
goods provision. In most studies a higher MPCR induces subjects to contribute more to the 
public good, as contributions become more valuable. It appears that subjects respond in a similar 
fashion when deciding whether or not to join a coalition. It may be that at a higher MPCR the 
coalition mechanism—which offers the opportunity to induce others to contribute—becomes 
more appealing. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that we do not—at this time—
have a good explanation for the divergence between theory and behavior in a laboratory setting. 
It is difficult to draw strong conclusions about our MPCR results when subjects behave contrary 
to theory even in a simple public goods game; this is an area that will require further research.  
The role of uncertainty is also an important issue in the experimental and IEA literatures. 
Previous work by Dickinson (1998) uses an individual-level regression analysis and finds some 
evidence that subjects reduce their contributions rates when public goods provision is uncertain. 
We find additional support for this result. Even while maintaining the expected return on the       2 7      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
public good, subjects reduced their contribution rates when we introduced uncertainty in public 
good provision.  
A more pressing question in the international agreements literature is whether uncertainty 
strengthens or weakens coalitions. The relevance to environmental goods is clear: when the 
benefits of abatement are uncertain should we expect more or less cooperation to provide a 
public good? Here the theory is ambiguous: some argue that coalition size will increase in the 
presence of uncertainty, while others argue the opposite. Our experimental evidence does not 
support either of these hypotheses; uncertainty has little effect on coalition formation. This 
suggests an opportunity to refine existing theories of coalition formation under uncertainty and 
employ more robust empirical methods to test the resulting predictions.       2 8      B u r g e r / K o l s t a d  
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Session MPCR T1: Public Goods T2: PG w/uncert. T3: Coalition T4: Coalition w/uncert.
1 0.3 50.5 46.0 50.0 47.5
2 0.3 40.0 35.5 29.0 26.5
   3* 0.3 14.5 14.0 49.5 30.5
4 0.6 56.5 51.0 55.0 54.5
5 0.6 54.0 41.5 56.0 43.0
   6* 0.6 44.0 44.5 54.5 46.0
7 0.3 11.0 15.0 25.0 20.0
8 0.6 58.0 63.5 66.0 65.0
Average - 41.1 38.9 48.1 41.6







    Low MPCR  High MPCR 
Treatment   
Contribution 
Rate Coalition  Size 
Contribution 
Rate Coalition  Size 
        
Public Goods  mean  0.290 . 0.531 . 
  std.  error  0.025 . 0.018 . 
        
PG w/uncert.  mean  0.276 . 0.501 . 
  std.  error  0.023 . 0.019 . 
        
Coalition  mean  0.384 3.500 0.579 5.063 
  std.  error  0.027 0.189 0.017 0.159 
        
Coalition   mean  0.311 3.450 0.521 5.050 
w/uncertainty  std.  error  0.029 0.186 0.034 0.144 
               
Total  mean  0.315 3.225 0.533 5.242 
  std.  error  0.013 0.132 0.012 0.107 
Notes: Contribution rates are averages across all periods and all participants for the low and high MPCR 
sessions by treatment.  
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Dependent variable is the per-period contribution rate
(a) (b) (c) 
Pooled MPCR = 0.3 MPCR = 0.6
Coaltion 0.049** 0.064** 0.034
(3.20) (2.93) (1.59)
Uncertainty -0.043** -0.043* -0.044
(-2.83) (-1.96) (-2.06)*
MPCR (high) 0.218** - -
(2.95) - -
Period Group 2 -0.073** -0.108** -0.038
(-3.15) (3.50) (-1.11)
Period Group 3 -0.056* -0.121** 0.010
(-2.56) (-3.72) (0.36)
Period Group 4 -0.158** -0.195** -0.120**
(-7.16) (-6.25) (-3.95)
Constant 0.384** 0.411** 0.575**
(6.97) (6.14) (15.30)
Observations 640 320 320
R
2 (overall) 0.26 0.11 0.08
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3 - Group Level Regressions
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Dependent variable is contribution decision
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Rnd Effects RE Probit RE Pro (low) RE Pro (high)
Coalition 0.049** 0.177** 0.244** 0.116**
(4.82) (4.88) (4.64) (2.29)
Uncertainty -0.043** -0.172** -0.171** -0.165**
(-4.27) (-4.73) (-3.25) (-3.25)
Session 2 0.050 -0.032 -0.543 -
(0.64) (-0.16) (-1.49) -
Session 3 -0.288** -0.807** -0.638* -
(-3.99) (-3.87) (-1.76) -
Session 4 0.375** 0.551** - -
(5.78) (2.66) --
Session 5 0.288** 0.851** - -0.269
(4.10) (3.93) - (-0.64)
Session 6 0.375** 1.262** - -0.341
(5.82) (5.28) - (-0.80)
Session 7 -0.488** -0.642** -0.970** -
(-8.19) (-3.12) (-2.67) -
Session 8 0.150* -0.066 - 0.244
(1.94) (-0.33) - (0.58)
Period Group 2 -0.073** -0.261** -0.380** -0.140**
(-4.92) (-5.13) (-5.24) (-1.96)
Period Group 3 -0.056** -0.195** -0.428** 0.037
(3.81) (-3.82) (-5.90) (0.51)
Period Group 4 -0.158** -0.572** -0.727** -0.422**
(-10.88) (-11.00) (-9.64) (-5.88)
Constant 0.554** 0.105 0.204 0.291
(6.67) (0.37) (0.77) (0.96)
Observations 6400 6400 3200 3200
log-likelihood - -3285.96 -1579.56 -1693.73
R
2 0.09 - - -
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
 